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My argument in this article, will be that nature, in general, and human nature in particular, suggests that,
in principle, it is possible to derive the causal time arrow from several physical time arrows existing in
nature and appearing to be unidirectional and irreversible phenomena. A more concrete argument will
be that the assumption of a causal time arrow to which geologists resort in all geo-historical explana-
tions, apparently originates in geo-historical time arrows concealed in unidirectional and irreversible
physical-geological processes. I will illustrate this claim with a few examples of geo-historical expla-
nations in the theory of plate tectonics, most of which are based on irreversible geo-physical processes.
My ﬁnal argument is a broader, of an epistemological nature, according to which the causal time arrow
assumption used in logical-causative explanations in everyday life and in science, apparently “derives” in
a way from the geo-historical time arrow. I will base this argument on the causal relationship and mutual
inﬂuence that occurs in nature between geo-historical and evolutionary processes in animals, including
developmental processes of the human brain and mind. From this reductionist argument, nicely inte-
grated in the framework of evolutionary epistemology (EEM), it is possible to derive a wider naturalistic
argument according to which, on principle, the laws of geo-historical physics can be reduced to the laws
of logic and causality.
 2016, China University of Geosciences (Beijing) and Peking University. Production and hosting by
Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The question of ‘what is time?’ has preoccupied and troubled
many philosophers from time immemorial. Even today, many are
concerned with this question, and, in fact, the puzzle of time re-
mains unresolved. Therefore, instead of dealing with the question
of whether time really exists or is just a ﬁgment of our thoughts, I
will deal mainly with its basic and common-sense property, that
differentiates between past and future - the asymmetric property,
or in the metaphorical description, the time arrow - the unidirec-
tional and irreversible geo-historical time arrow, based mainly on
the laws of physics and geology. To achieve this goal, I will focus on
the actualist logic, at the basis of geo-historical explanations that
enables geologists to reconstruct the geological past of the Earth.
First, I will argue that this logic, among other things, is based on the
fundamental metaphysical principle according to which the causeof Geosciences (Beijing).
eijing) and Peking University. Produ
c-nd/4.0/).
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5.006always precedes the effect in time. Furthermore, this claim can be
based on the geo-historical time arrow that empirically reﬂects
geo-physical processes temporally irreversible. I can support this
argument by several examples. Finally, I will argue a causal relation
in a biological-physical sense between the geo-historical time ar-
rowand the biological time arrow. In the last part of the article I will
attempt to present an argument based on the Darwinian view of
nature, that supports the central argument of this paper, concern-
ing the possibility of reducing the geo-historical time arrow which
is physical in essence, to the causal time arrow, that constitutes the
solid base for any scientiﬁc and nonscientiﬁc explanation. From this
reductionist argument, which is well integrated into the framework
of evolutionary epistemology (EEM), we can derive a wider natu-
ralistic argument claiming that, on principle, it is possible to reduce
the geo-historical laws of physics to the laws of logic and causality.
2. The logical-causal argument structure in geo-historical
explanations
One of the major challenges of modern science that is based on
an empirical approach, is to explain the signiﬁcance of allegationsction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
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7 For a more in-depth discussion about the methodologies of geo-historical in-
ferences and planetary sciences inferences, see: Peirce (1867, 1883), Chamberlin
(1890, 1904, 1897), Gilbert (1896), Engelhard and Zimmermann (1988) and Baker
(2014). However, it must be remembered that analogical inferences are nothing
more than inductive inferences, and in this sense they are not logically valid in a
deductive sense.
8 The circularity of causality was already known to skeptical philosophers in
ancient Greek. About this circularity see for example: Barnes (1990, p. 58e89).
9 About this process, see e.g., Peirce (1867, 1883), Chamberlin (1890, 1904, 1897),
Gilbert (1896), Kitts (1977), Baker (2014), Kravitz (2012, 2013) and Cleland (2013). It
should be emphasized that what I say here in not unique to just geology. In all
scientiﬁc observations we can observe the outcome, but the cause is always a best
hypothesis which we can test. The big difference is that in geology it is difﬁcult to
replicate the conditions needed to test that causal hypothesis and moreover geol-
G. Kravitz / Geoscience Frontiers xxx (2016) 1e102relating to the past. The veriﬁcation process based on traces of the
past is no more than our interpretation. The actualist approach in
modern geology1 supposedly solves the problem by claiming that
geological past events on Earth have current and future effects, and
those can be veriﬁed directly by the geologist. The current actualist
method assumes that on the basis of observations of geological
phenomena that occur in the present, we can reconstruct and
explain the geological past of the Earth in an analogical way (or
with the help of analogies). In this sense, the geo-historian thinks
back (towards the past) and thus, supposedly, artiﬁcially inverts the
time direction of the geo-historical processes that occur in nature.
What could justify the use of analogical explanations to reconstruct
the geological past of the Earth from observations of geological events
taking place in the present and from traces left by the geological past?
The analogical inferences are not applicable to conclusions that
arise from assumptions on the basis of logical necessity, but are
regarded as the most probable or the least probable. In geo-
historical explanations, high probability is achieved thanks to the
uniformity principle2 assumed by geologists, which conceals the
fundamental generalization about causality that claims that the
causal relationship between geological causes and outcomes does
not change signiﬁcantly over time, and therefore, we may assume
that the same causes lead to the same outcomes3. Speciﬁcally, in
order to produce an analogy between two entities is to start, by
pointing out one or more attributes and revealing the similarity
between them. An analogical inference is based on similarity of two
or more things, and projecting this similarity on some other aspect
of these things. In other words, an analogy is produced through the
observance of common features between certain things and the
conclusion that another similar feature can also be found in them.
Such simple inductive inferences accompany our daily thinking
regularly and without them we could not survive.
In a rather simple way, the pattern of arguments (inferences) by
analogy can be described as follows4:
Premise A e thing A contains features 1, 2, 3, ..
Premise B e thing B contains features 1, 2, 3, ..
Premise C e it is found that thing A also contains feature 7.
Conclusion e therefore thing B also contains feature 7.
Since in geology we deal, among other things, with processes
and geological phenomena that occurred a long time ago, the
analogical inferences play a large role in our profession, and their
level of complexity exceeds even that of most natural sciences5 that
are not concerned with “deep time”6. In geo-historical explana-
tions, in addition to the similarity between the features of
geological phenomena and events, geologists are also looking for
similarities between causal laws that generally comprise an
explanation of the mechanism operating in the geological process.
In this sense, they assume that the causal mechanism that produces
the geological phenomena, does not change signiﬁcantly (the1 For a more in-depth discussion regarding the historical development of this
approach, see Romano (2015).
2 For a more in-depth discussion regarding the historical development of this
principle, see Romano (2015).
3 It is crucial to note here that the uniformity principle is applied in order to
provide logical necessity for inferences to the past. However, this need to have
logical necessity in explanation is an issue for the rational reconstructions made by
philosophers. In practice working geologists are far more interested in the fruit-
fulness of their proposed explanations (hypotheses) than in their logical necessity.
4 It should be noted that is not exactly how geologists use analogy in practice. In
practice the use of analogy combines the inductive premises illustrated with an
abductive inference that forms a causal hypothesis. For more details about this
inference, see Kravitz (2013).
5 Concerning the methodological and epistemic differences between historical
science and experimental science, see Cleland (2002).
6 About the role of analogical reasoning in geology, see Baker (2014).
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cause and outcome in two similar geological phenomena does not
change over time7. Such a causal law permits the actualist to argue
legitimately that, on the basis of observations of outcomes and
process in the present, the geologist is able to reconstruct the past.
Thus, actualism assumes that outcomes can explain or prove the
causes just as causes can explain and prove the outcomes. How can
we justify this claim? Or how can we justify that the causes originated
from the outcomes? Like in the “chicken and egg” paradox, there’s a
certain kind of circularity - causes explain the outcome and out-
comes explain the causes8. However, we must keep in mind that
contrary to the causes to which geologists mostly have no direct
access, outcomes possess certainty and this accounts for their
importance in geo-historical explanations. Typically, geologists are
able to identify outcomes in the present quite clearly, but they do
not have direct access to the past so the causes remain speculative.
Geologists try to derive the causes from the outcomes, because
empirically the outcomes are accessible and in this sense they are
the most certain thing they have. This is similar to the scientiﬁc
method presented by Decartes in his famous book “A Discourse on
the Method” (Kenaz, 2010, p. 40e50, 90e107), since in the science
of geology, causes cannot prove outcomes, but only explain and
clarify them. The role of the causes is to explain or clarify the
outcomes and the role of the outcomes is to test, validate, support
and conﬁrm the causes. Therefore, in order to explain causes, ge-
ologists assume them by a process of selecting the best hypothesis,
which is sometimes called IBE e inference to the best explanation9.
In this sense, an unproven, logically invalid “jump” of hypotheses
(causes) emanating from facts (outcomes). In fact a recognized
problem or question arises here10: how can we prove the hypothesis
which explains observations solely on the basis of outcome which are
singular observation? In practice, in order to circumvent the difﬁ-
culty and enable practical geological work to proceed, the actualists
construct the past by building a theoretical conceptual system
(uniformity principle) connecting the facts to the causes11. With theogists tend to eliminate multiple hypotheses when working in the ﬁeld, at least
according to the classic works on the philosophy of geology.
10 Here I am referring to the famous problem of induction raised by David Hume.
About this issue, see: Bonjour (2009, p. 47e69), Feldman (2003, p. 130e141).
11 Using the uniformity principle geologists, in fact, are trying to turn the condi-
tional sentences “if C occurred then E occurred” to an essential conditional sentence
that event C is an essential condition for event E. In other words, they try to make
the pattern of the sentence to patterns of the form “Event E occurred only if event C
occurred” or “If event C and only event C occurred then event E occurred.” In these
sentences if event C occurred then necessarily event E occurred but the converse
case does not necessarily exist (in normal conditional sentences the ﬁrst section is a
sufﬁcient condition for the ﬁnal section and the ﬁnal section is a necessary con-
dition for the ﬁrst section). For further details, see: Kravitz (2013, p. 29e32). I will
hereby clarify some of the concepts, such as “sufﬁcient condition” and “obligatory
condition.” Sufﬁcient Condition dEvent H is a sufﬁcient condition for the occur-
rence of event I only, and only if when event H occurs, event I too occurs, i.e., it is
enough that H occurs for I to occur. Obligatory Conditiond Event H is an obligatory
condition for the occurrence of event I, only, and only if without the occurrence of
event H, event I cannot occur, i.e., if H does not occur, I too cannot occur.
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geologists search for a feature or circumstance that is relevant to
another because it has a causal effect on it. In that sense they
actually construct the geological past instead of ﬁnding it, as the
naive actualist approach believes12. However, it should be noted
that in order to evaluate analogical arguments, speciﬁc knowledge
of causal relationships is needed and these can be revealed only by
empirical tools e observation and experiment. This knowledge is
perceived by geologists as a solid scientiﬁc base onwhich, in fact, all
causal explanations of geo-history are based. Explanations based on
causal relations alone are scientiﬁcally inadequate for geologists to
explain the factors (causes) of the occurrence of geological phe-
nomena observed empirically in the present (effects). Nevertheless,
in spite of the difference between logical and causal implications13,
geologists tend to use combined logical-causal arguments14. That
means that logical arguments are used, but actually these expla-
nations are causal explanations, based on factual arguments on the
state of affairs regarding the geological state of the Earth in the past
and in the present, that require testing of things in the world15. In
other words, geologists believe there is an injective correspondence
between logical reasons and implications expressed through lin-
guistic epistemological creations (phrases and claims), and physical
causes that actually occur in nature (ontological entities), alleged to
be among them, dominate the nature of causal implications. In a
sense, there is an unproven transition (“jump”) even here, and
therefore the transition from the epistemological level to the
ontological level of the world remains in doubt. The relevant
questions in this connection are: is it possible to justify such a
transition and if so, in what way? Can geologists practically avoid such
a transition, and if so, how? Before attempting to answer these
questions, I will brieﬂy discuss a few philosophical issues, emerging
from a look at the logical forms of arguments and geo-historical
explanations, assuming that their use is justiﬁed, at least in prac-
tical sense. Actually, by using these arguments (explanations) ge-
ologists are attempting to fulﬁll the requirement of empiricism in
modern science e that of testability.
Geologists have four possible structures (patterns) of logical -
causal arguments at their disposal in order to provide a reasonable
geo-historical explanation, in which C indicates cause and E in-
dicates effect16. In all these arguments, sentences (1) and (2) are
introductions (or premises) and sentence (3) represents the
conclusion of the argument. The arguments are as follows:12 This claim is true for analogical arguments that go either from the cause to the
outcome or from the outcome to the cause. On realism in relation to geology of the
past, see: Kravitz (2013, p. 20e22), Kravitz (2012, p. 9e23).
13 In logic we are dealing with deductive inferences and not with casual expla-
nations. Inferences are something in the mind (intellect) and causes are something
in the physical (mechanical) world. When talking about justiﬁcation we’re talking
about inferences and not about physical causes.
14 Concerning the use of a variety of logical-causal arguments, see: Engelhardt and
Zimmermann (1988, p. 139e233).
15 In this sense, this fact in itself can indicate the realistic faith of geologists about
our ability to know the physical world around us, through the ways of judgment
and reasoning in the human mind (or in the language of Kant which we’ll discuss
further, using categories and pure intuitions).
16 It is worth mentioning here that not every historical explanation is an expla-
nation based on causality and therefore logical-causal inferences aren’t always
necessary. Historical explanations can be purposeful explanations dealing with the
motives of people and other states of consciousness. These explanations do not
require laws or causal legality (causality is descriptive, not judgmental); they are
essentially normative explanations (ethical judgments: better, more rightful, etc.) in
a speciﬁc sense and are not logical. In contrast to these, in geo-history we often deal
with the causes and laws because geo-historical explanations are based on the laws
of physics and are described by historical events. However, in some cases in geo-
history, we also deal with descriptive explanations of a given geo-historical
narrative. About descriptive explanations, see footnote 109 in Kravitz (2013, p. 38).
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(1) If C occurred then E occurred
(2) C occurred
(3) Therefore, E occurred
II.
(1) If C occurred then E occurred
(2) C has not occurred
(3) Therefore, E did not occur
III.
(1) If C occurred then E occurred
(2) E occurred
(3) Therefore, C occurred
IV.
(1) If C occurred then E occurred
(2) E has not occurred
(3) Therefore, C has not occurredA fundamental difﬁculty is associated with the ﬁrst premise in
these arguments, which I regard as the main theme in the current
article. As you can see, in all inferences mentioned above, the ﬁrst
premise is identical and constitutes a causal conditional sentence,
the ﬁrst section of which refers to the cause, and the ﬁnal section -
to the outcome. From a formal logical point of view, this sentence
claims that if the ﬁrst section is real then the ﬁnal section is real as
well, and describes a relation between the ﬁrst and ﬁnal section
without going into the reason (content) and meaning of the rela-
tionship between the two parts of the sentence. However, although
this is a conditional sentence (material implication) integral to the
entire logical argument, and to the content and meaning of the
concepts it contains, it is also concerned with causal relations be-
tween the cause and the outcome, so that the ﬁnal section of it isn’t
necessarily implicated logically, or by deﬁnition, from its ﬁrst sec-
tion, but is due rather to the causal relation between them (any
causal law). This premise, in fact, allows a causal argument to be
presented as a logical argument. Presenting a logical argument
does not involve any intention to determine something about the
state of the world. The only intention is to indicate a logical
implication between the assumptions of the argument and its
conclusion. In this case, the ﬁrst premise serves as a liaison between
logical and causal implications, and, therefore, has great impor-
tance in a geo-historical explanation. This premise, in fact, a com-
plex sentence, created, in a syntactic manner, from simple
sentences, one of which is the conclusion. Thus it is possible to turn
a complex sentence “if C occurred then E occurred” into an inde-
pendent inference with a simple sentence “C occurred; therefore, E
occurred”17. These sentence and argument are synthetic (as
opposed to analytic), i.e. the complex sentence is not a valid logical
argument, but rather extends the knowledge. In the predicate it
tells what is not considered in the concept of the subject, that is, the
predicate is not included in the subject. Its truth is not based solely
on the law of non-contradiction and it depends not only on the
meaning of its terms (or their deﬁnitions) and on its logical form. It
imparts posteriori knowledge expressed in a synthetic sentence.
This statement is posterior and thus derives from experience, and
its truth is contingent18. In other words, causal sentences of this
kind are posterior and synthetic, arise from experience, and their7 During their daily work the geologists are confronted with a multitude of
ractical problems concerning geological causality. For example, they often claim
at the same cause can have various effects (divergence) or that various causes
uld produce the same effect (convergence). In addition, they claim that a certain
fect is sometimes caused by a combination of various causes (multiplicity). With
gard to practical problems pertaining to geological causality, see Schumm (1998,
. 58e75, 95e119) and Cleland (2013, p. 4e7).
8 The origin of the distinction between analytic and synthetic is in Kant. In order
facilitate rather than confuse the reader about Kant’s precise observations, I have
mpliﬁed and clariﬁed these concepts as far as possible. For lack of space, these
ncepts will not be discussed beyond what has been said here. For the purpose of a
ore detailed discussion of these concepts, see: Yovel (2013, p. 35e39).
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lationships expressed by these sentences can be detected only
empirically or logically19, and are, in fact, inductive generalizations,
“disguised” as causal laws20, behind which three classic meta-
physical assumptions about causality are hidden: (a) any outcome
necessarily has a cause (the principle of causality) (b) identical
causes necessarily have identical outcomes (an actualist claim
based on the principle of uniformity of nature and sometimes
known as causal lawfulness) (c) the cause always precedes the
outcome in time (the causal time arrow).
In my opinion, assumption (c) is the most important because it
turns the conditional sentence noted above, into a historical
sentence used as a covering law (Hempel’s covering law
model)21 to any historical-causal explanation, without which
the explanation is not possible. In other words, without this
premise, a geo-historical explanation would not be possible
since it deals with the most important historical feature of time,
the irreversible direction - from past to future.
When the geologist in his argument, assumes that “if C occurred
then E occurred”, he implicitly assumes that E can occur only after C
has occurred. In other words, C always precedes E in time. Although
it is a metaphysical assumption of causality in the classic sense, how
can it possibly be justiﬁed in order to “save” the logical-causal ar-
guments? Why must geologists make this assumption without
which a geo-historical explanation is impossible?What is the origin
of this? Since we are dealing with logical arguments and sentences
from the structural point of view and with causal arguments from
the point of view of content, I claim that the answers to these
questions obtains its empirical validity from the world of empirical
phenomena surrounding us. Since the science of geology is based
on physical phenomena, it must justify the use of these arguments
and sentences on the basis of unidirectional physical laws irre-
versible in time, onwhich its geo-historical explanations are based.
The necessity lies in the fact that geologists, as human beings, have
evolved within the framework of these laws in the course of the
evolution of the Earth and the animal world. In order to clarify this
position I will ﬁrst present examples of geo-historical explanations
based on the unidirectional laws of physics, irreversible in time and
implicitly based on assumption (c) as described above. Then I will
try to present philosophical arguments that support this position,
and enable us to discuss about a possible reduction between the
physical time arrow occurring in nature and the causal arrow
expressed in geo-historical explanations and in any kind of his-
torical thinking that deals with events of the past22.19 As I explained above, in classical logic, conditional sentences say something
about the existing relationship between the ﬁrst section and the ﬁnal section. They
can represent different types, such as sentences in which the ﬁnal section is logi-
cally implicated from the ﬁrst section or from the deﬁnitions of concepts contained
in the sentence, and so on. Geology and other natural sciences, often use condi-
tional sentences in which the connection between the initial and ﬁnal sections is an
empirical-causal relationship. In any case, it is important to understand that logi-
cally, the logical feature common to all the conditional sentences is that if the ﬁrst
section is true and the ﬁnal section is false them the conditional sentence is false.
20 In the language of Kant it can be said that these sentences represent the
category of the human mind “cause and outcome” (causality and outcomes) that is
expressed in a logical form (intellectual form) under the section “relation” and form
of judgment (or form of the sentence “hypothetical”). About these concepts see:
Yovel (2013, p. 50, 169e175). For further details about the metaphysical assump-
tions of causation, see: Kravitz (2013, p. 31e32).
21 Model of explanation according to which to explain an event by reference to
another event necessarily presupposes an appeal to laws or general propositions
correlating events of the type to be explained with events of the type cited as its
causes or conditions. For in depth details, see Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).
22 About reductionism in geology, see: Kravitz (2013, p. 33e38).
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3.1. Unidirectional geological processes, irreversible in time
From observations of geological processes occurring in the
present and of signs that the geological past of the Earth has left us,
geological processes, unidirectional and irreversible in time, can be
identiﬁed. These processes have occurred in the distant past, and
are still active in the present, thus suggesting that concealed behind
them are natural laws with a speciﬁc direction from past to future,
over deep geological time. On the basis of these laws, geo-
historians are able to consider the geological past of the Earth
and explain it by means of the causal arguments described above.
For example, by resorting to the geo-physical model, modern ge-
ology can explain, the factors of the movement of the tectonic
plates, and reconstruct the geological structure of the Earth in the
distant past. According to this model, ﬁssures or mid-oceanic ridges
originated from the heat and pressure generated by the core of the
Earth23 as a result of thermonuclear disintegration of radioactive
foundations, such as U, Th and 40K. The heat, generated in depth,
moves in the direction of the surface through convection currents.
These currents, active in the asthenosphere, transport the heat in
their movement upwards toward the surface, thus providing the
moving force to the plates on the surface of the planet. In this
process the temperature reachesmore than 4000 C. As a result, the
outer core of the earth melts and creates a heat ﬂux between
approximately 3800 C at the base and 1200 C at the top of the
shell. In the course of time, heat transfer occurs from the top of the
core to the base of the crust and some of the heated material breaks
through the crust into the volcanoes on the surface and the large
part of the material rises to the top of the mantle and ﬂows to the
sides, where it cools down and its speciﬁc gravity increases grad-
ually, sinks back into the mantle and so on. In the course of this
process, the convection current rises under the mid-oceanic ridge,
splits, andmoves to both sides. As a result of thismovement it drags
the oceanic lithosphere, using friction in order tomove the plates to
both sides. Part of the current bursts out to the sea ﬂoor and when
the lava cools, it turns into basalt and actually increases the surface
of the ocean’s ﬂoor. As the perimeter of the Earth does not change,
the growth of the sea ﬂoor in one place must be balanced by a
decrease in another, or, in other words, spreading land must settle
somewhere else and return to the mantle. At the other end the
oceanic plate is pushed underneath and produces a subduction
zone characterized by an oceanic chasm, volcanic island arches and
often a marginal sea, that is, on one side of the plate a new ocean is
opened and on the other side an ancient ocean closes24. In the
ocean that has been opened, among others, the activity of sedi-
mentary rocks stratigraphy such as: clastic rocks, biogenic rocks,
chemical rocks etc. begins. The stratigraphy of these sedimentary
rocks occurs during geological time over basic rocks (igneous rocks)
and metamorphic rocks of the crust of the Earth that are exposed
on the surface surrounding most regions on the surface of the
planet.
As can be seen, the simplistic explanation described above, is
mainly based, consciously or unconsciously, on unidirectional laws
of physics irreversible in time. The Earth, being awarm body, strives23 As known today, most of the heat inside the Earth comes from the decay of
radioactive materials. However, there are, or once were, sources of additional heat
caused by the gravity of the Earth (especially in the early stages of Earth’s forma-
tion), tidal forces (when the moonwas closer to Earth), the friction generated by the
movement of the plates and the heat radiated during crystallization of the core
(Poirier, 2000, p. 230e231).
24 For in depth details, see for example Stewart (1990, p. 72e123).
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of the process of stratigraphy of sediments and others, most of the
global system described above is a “mechanism” responsible for the
continuous cooling of the Earth25. By looking at these processes and
cooling mechanisms and the stratigraphy process of sedimentary
rocks, it is possible to identify a number of geo-physical laws with a
historic and progressive characterization in time26. These processes
allow geologists to make a clear distinction between geological
events that have occurred in the past and those that occur in the
present, and to link both of them to a cause, which always occurred
in the past, while the outcome occurs in the future, and not vice
versa. In general terms, these processes can be divided into three
main types:
(1) Radioactive production of heat resulting from the disintegra-
tion (decay) of radioactive materials and the radiation emitted
as a result.
(2) Thermodynamic activity related to cooling processes through
convection currents. In fact there are three types of physical
processes responsible for heat transfer: conduction, radiation
and convection. The dominant process in the geo-physical
model, as presented above, is convection.
(3) Stratigraphic activity of new marine sedimentary rocks.
Below is a summarized description of these processes:
(1) Radioactive production of heat in the core of the Earth, origi-
nating in the process of disintegration of radioactive materials
which is asymmetric with regard to the direction of the time
arrow, i.e. it is a one-way and irreversible process in time.
When geologists assume a constant decay of nuclide and a
uniform rate of radioactive decay, they assume asymmetry and
non-reversibility of the time arrow. Radioactive nuclide breaks
down spontaneously and at a known rate, from a parent
radioisotope state into a daughter nuclide. The disintegration
always occurs spontaneously in one direction, from an unstable
state of the atom to a more stable atom. This asymmetry and
irreversibility is similar, in a way, to the asymmetry of the
thermodynamic time arrow, they share the same direction,
from past to future, and never the other way round. It is
possible to test this assumption by looking at the language and
professional terms used by geologists to explain radioactive
phenomena, such as half-life, the absolute age of a rock, the
rate of decay, and so on. These concepts indirectly suggest that
geologists assume that the geological time arrow is unidirec-
tional; otherwise, these terms would have no meaning. If, for
example, geologists had assumed that the time arrow is
reversible, what would be the meaning of the term “half-life”?25 This is the process of cooling itself. This does not mean that the Earth actually
cools. Although the radioactive decay is the main heat source, there may be other
sources not yet known to us and therefore the subject still arouses controversy and
debate among geologists (Poirier, 2000, p. 230). If we assume that the only heat
source is due to disintegration of radioactive materials, it is clear that today the
Earth is in the process of cooling. Most geologists believe that a permanent
reduction in the energy reserve of the Earth exists as a result of the amortization of
radioactive materials (undergoing decay). For example, we now know that the
energy associated with the disintegration of radioactive material in Earth, is 5.5
times smaller than the energy that Earth had 5 billion years ago.
26 Of course there are other chemical and physical processes (reversible and
irreversible in time) that participate in the global process described here, but since
the article is philosophical, I do not intend to go into details concerning these
processes. On the one hand the processes listed above are central in the global
process and on the other hand are quite easy for the average reader who is not
proﬁcient in investigative disciplines practiced in various Earth sciences, to
understand.
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processes through convection currents, is based mainly on the
laws of thermodynamics, in general and on the second law of
thermodynamics, in particular27. A convention related to this
activity concerns the spontaneous transfer of energy from the
warm part of earth, in which radioactive production of heat
occurs, to the colder part28 in correspondence with the second
law of thermodynamics. This law clearly supports the evolu-
tionary world view of geologists because it is the only law of
physics that describes the progressive development of macro-
scopic systems in time (Kravitz, 2013, p. 26e29). The second law
of thermodynamics describes the macroscopic world of nature
as a world governed by an asymmetric and irreversible time
arrow e in other words, is describes a series of unique events,
joined to each other and developing in one direction (law of
historical succession). Therefore, the majority of physical phe-
nomena, irreversible in the time dimension, are explained by
this law. In statistical mechanics, the second law of thermody-
namics is a lawof probability basedon a basic concept inphysics,
that of entropy. Entropy is a measure of disorder in physical
systems. The second lawof thermodynamics states that in closed
isolated physical systems, entropy can be maintained or can
even grow in the course of time up to a point of thermodynamic
equilibrium, which is the most probable ﬁnal state from a sta-
tistical point of view (as an aspect of microscopic dispersion of
states) inwhich the system can exist (a state ofmaximal entropy
and disorder). The law enables the inference that every closed
and isolated physical system has a time arrow with a clear di-
rection, from a state of low entropy (in the past) to a state of
thermodynamic equilibrium (in the future), inwhich the system
receives the highest value that it can sustain.
(3) One of the basic principles of stratigraphy is the principle of
superposition which was ﬁrst articulated by Nicolas Steno
(1638e1686). The principle can be formulated as follows
(Kravitz, 2014, p. 692):
“In any undisturbed continuum of strata, any stratum will be
younger than the stratum on which it rests, and older than the
stratum that rests on it. In other words, in an undisturbed
continuum of sedimentary rocks, any stratum will be younger
than that on which it rests, and older than that resting on it, i.e.,
in a stratigraphic column, the strata of rocks are arranged ac-
cording to the order of their formation e from the older (at the
bottom of the column) to the younger (at the top of the
column).”
From this formulation it is easy to understand that the strati-
graphic process of a sedimentary rock is a one-way process irre-
versible in time. Steno based the principle of superposition on the
law of gravity. He noticed that particles sink in ﬂuid in quantities
relative to their size and weight. The ﬁrst to sink are the largest,
followed gradually by the smaller ones. Changes in the size of
particles cause the creation of horizontal strata or stratiﬁcation. In
other words, if we assume that uniformity is preserved in the laws
of nature (in this case, in the law of gravity), the strata are stratiﬁed
one after the other, so that in any kind of geological continuum, any
given layer must be older than the layers above it, and younger than27 Here the explanation for thermodynamic processes will be general and quali-
tative, but sufﬁcient for the purposes of this article. For a detailed and quantitative
explanation, see: Poirier (2000, p. 230e244).
28 As I described above, in general, there are three types of mechanisms respon-
sible for heat transfer: conduction, radiation and convection. The most important
mechanism in the geo-physical model is convection so I will put special emphasis
on it. As for the rest of the heat transfer mechanisms, see Turcotte and Shubert
(2002, p. 132e194, 262e292).
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ways precedes the future, and that future events are causally
inﬂuenced by past eventse namely that causality is one-directional
from past to future. The causes have occurred in the past, and the
results occur in the present or in the future; therefore, the cause
must always precede the result. If so, the process of stratiﬁcation
occurs in the course of a long time in one direction e from past to
future. Although this process is related to the laws of gravity rather
than to the thermodynamic or quantum processes, it is also a
physical process that allows geologists to make a causal link be-
tween the geological events that have occurred in the past and the
geological events occurring in the present, where the cause is al-
ways shown in the past and the outcome appears in the future,
rather than vice versa.
3.2. Unidirectional biological processes, irreversible in time
As described above, most of the global geo-historical processes
are explained by geologists by resorting to unidirectional laws of
physics and geology irreversible in time. An examination of the
various aspects of evolution shows that these laws have affected and
still affect the geology of the Earth and indirectly affect the climate
and the animalworld. Humans, being part of the animalworld,were,
and still are, affected by these laws, and not only in the narrow
biological sense. The Neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory assumes
that, in principle, there are two major causal mechanisms: (1) a
variationmechanismwhich is a genetic mechanism causing change,
followingmutations or thedevelopment of various viruses andother
causal mechanisms of change, over time; (2) the natural selection
mechanism - responsible for selection in the biological world, in a
way that the surviving creatures have a feature that meets certain
environmental conditionsprevailingonearth, and thosewhodidnot
survive, lack this feature. That is, in certain environmental condi-
tions, certain features could enjoy an advantage compared to others,
in terms of reproduction and the transfer of traits to the next gen-
eration. Such features can be, for instance resistance to weather, to
geological conditions, to disease, the capacity to utilize particular
foods, camouﬂage, etc. Geological environmental conditions29 are
the critical element in both causal mechanisms, and are followed by
changes in climate and in the entire world of ﬂora and fauna. Since
geological environmental conditions are changing in time in accor-
dance with unidirectional processes irreversible in time, it is likely
that the mechanism of natural selection also acts as a cause within
the framework of these laws.
Manyexamples fromtheﬁeldof biologyand theevolutionofﬂora
and fauna support this claim: for example, the evolution of different
species of organisms normally proceeds irreversibly. This develop-
ment can be divided into three biological branches advancing from
the past to the future, that are compatible with Darwin’s theory of
evolution (Denbigh, 1989, p. 504e505). The ﬁrst branching out to-
wards the future in the organic world occurred already in ancient
Earth, even before the creation of the ﬂora and fauna. As the ancient
universe gradually cooled, chemical evolution accelerated and the
amount of stable molecules grew. This process resulted, among
others, in the proliferation of organic molecules that resulted in
biological evolution. The second branching pertains to what Darwin
called divergence. Since the appearance of initial life on Earth, many
branches of the new species have evolved in accordance to the
mechanisms of variation and natural selection. During this process
various features developed in creatures with a common origin. This
usually happens when different forces operate on the same species.29 Here I’m referring to mutagenic sources of variability that they have a deep
impact on the rate of mutations development.
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organism. Physiological development of an individual organism
proceeds in one direction, irreversible in time, similar to the direc-
tion of the development of the entire biosphere. For example, the
process of cell division in the body begins from one particular cell
and proceeds in the direction of multiple cells in the adult organism.
Evolutionary development in the animal world brought about
mental development of more advanced beings, ﬁrst and foremost
humans. Mental processes, such as the biological processes
described above are also, in a sense, unidirectional and irreversible
in time. The following quote and speciﬁcation supports this argu-
ment in principle (Denbigh, 1989, p. 504e505):
“In higher animals there is also the irreversibility of mental
processes which, as experienced in ourselves at least, is a
branching of one thought into another, a branching into a
blooming, buzzing array of new beliefs and intentions, new
desires and emotions. Many of these mental items remain with
us as an accumulation in the memory. Perception and cognition
thus appear as an adding on towhat is already in our minds, and
not as a subtraction; for once we have seen or known something
we never undergo the hypothetical reverse process of unseeing
or unknowing that thing. This point was nicely illustrated by
Costa de Beauregard (1963, p. 115) when he remarked on the
absurdity of supposing that, having read some book, we could
delete from our minds everything said in the book by the act of
reading it backwards, from end to beginning! The branching
which occurs in mental activity is often the making of
connections-it is the putting together of clues to form some new
and meaningful whole in the mind. As Polanyi in particular has
emphasized, once the newwhole has been grasped its clues take
on a different character. A nice example is provided by problem
pictures such as the one shown in the Tractatuswherewe see an
animal’s head facing to the left, and then we quickly realize that
the picture also shows a different animal’s head facing to the
right. Once that double meaning has been grasped we cannot
withdraw that understanding and see the picture as repre-
senting one animal only. The cognition is irreversible.”
From cognitive development irreversible in time, as described
above, it is reasonable to assume that the causal-logical structure of
human thought has also been affected signiﬁcantly by that. Thanks
to this development, for example, we can legitimately refer to
inductive judgment bywhichwe intuitively implicate from the past
to the future rather than the other way round. In addition, as we
have seen, any historical and geo-historical explanation is logically
based on the causal arrow that assumes that the cause always
precedes the outcome in time, thus enabling geo-historians to as-
sume causal laws of the kind of “if C happened then E happened” at
the base of logical arguments.
If so, what was said so far can be summed up in the most
schematic way, as follows: unidirectional laws, irreversible in time,
control the geo-historical nature of Earth and have left their imprint
on the evolution processes of the ﬂora and fauna. As a result,
creatures with a mindset that is unidirectional, irreversible in time
and capable of causal implication from cause to outcome, have
evolved on Earth. Out of this ability, another ability has developed,
that of implicating from the outcome to the cause. In both cases, we
understand that the cause precedes the outcome in time.
4. Evolution, epistemology and the relationship between
them
The category of causality formulated by Kant, discussed in this
paper, is one of the patterns of our minds that we impose on the
impressions of the senses. That’s to say, that the fundamental lawsausal time arrow in geo-historical explanations, Geoscience Frontiers
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Precisely because of this state of affairs they can be constant,
necessary and universal since the sensations and sensing impres-
sions are fragmented and constantly changing, whereas the mind
has ﬁxed patterns without which we cannot perceive theworld and
create science. These are general patterns into which the sensual
impressions enter. They are, in fact, the basic concepts (categories)
of the mind, that establish and stabilize experience and nature.
Without these concepts, we cannot explain any coherent experi-
ence and the science in which scientists work.
Unlike Kant’s approach, I would argue that there cannot really
be a separation between human knowledge and the world of
nature, because the human mind, as I have shown above, oper-
ates within the framework of the human brain that had evolved
as part of the natural world (natural fauna) in the course of
evolution and through the mechanisms of natural selection.
Therefore, the concepts (categories) of the mind and the forms of
perception (space and time), can only be experimental because
the process of the development of the brain and the mind over
time through natural selection, is an experimental process in
every respect e whatever survives this experience endures and
whatever does not e is completely or partially extinct. This is
how an adjustment between the concepts of the mind and the
outside world, which is subject to impressions of the mind is
created. My claim is empiricist in the broader sense. Both the
concepts and sensory impressions of our mind originate in the
experimental world. Man is not born a tabula rasa e the exper-
imental knowledge has accumulated in the course of the evolu-
tion of the brain and leaves an impression in his mind. Hence the
validity of the laws of nature e under which the mind developed,
and that’s its reﬂection on what happens in the world. In other
words, the laws of nature and the categories are immanently
“seared” in the genome of the human brain and in our mind.
From our perspective they appear a priori but in fact the concepts
of the mind are a posteriori in the broad sense of learning from
the experience of evolution. I agree with Kant’s argument that
thanks to them our daily experience is possible, but only within
the framework of the learned concepts and sensations accumu-
lated from the long experience of evolution.
In other words, I argue that no one can have a priori but only a
posteriori knowledge. Any knowledge is a posteriori in a particular
context and meaning. Even the categories and the forms of the
mind, are “templates” of the mind built as developmental functions
of the human brain in the course of evolution. These “templates”
are actually preserving the accumulated experience during their
formation in certain environmental conditions. The logic of
thinking itself is a logic based on experience concepts and in fact
the analytical claims, in their form and content, originate from
accumulated experience during human evolution. In other words,
analytic claims, contrary towhatmany people think, do not depend
only on the meaning of the expressions that appear in them. The
experience is inherent in these expressions by virtue of evolution
that shaped them during a long time and so if we deny analytic
claims or deductive arguments, we do not necessarily receive a
logical contradiction. In other words, these claims and arguments
are not necessarily true. Sometimes if language or logic is replaced,
the contradiction may disappear. In this sense, I support the
naturalistic position. I believe that humanity is part of nature and
all the laws of nature that apply to other beings and are objects in
nature, apply to it as well. In accordance with the theory of evo-
lution, the creation of Humans took a long time in the course of
which the experiencewas impressed in the “templates” of themind
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described above, and are affected by the development of the ge-
ology and the ﬂora and fauna of the earth in a direct and necessary
way. Our ability to invent and learn a language is due to the
structure of these templates. The logical and the natural language
sentences were formed unconsciously on the basis of the inherent
evolutionary experience impressed in the mind’s categories and
hence they can never be analytical - a priori or synthetic a priori, as
Kant thought. This claim is supported and well illustrated by the
following quote (Campbell, 1974, p. 441):
“Though we reject Kant’s claims of a necessary a priori validity
for the categories, we can in evolutionary perspective regard the
categories as highly edited, much tested presumptions, “vali-
dated” only as scientiﬁc truth is validated - synthetic a posteriori
from the point of view of species-history, synthetic and in
several ways a priori (but not in terms of necessary validity)
from the point of view of an individual organism.”
Nature established the experience as absolutely necessary and
therefore probably the causal connection is also necessary. As
described before, the causal necessity and the causal time arrow are
products of the unidirectional and irreversible in time processes
and natural laws, within which and by which the human mind has
evolved. This mind has evolved so that if it understands the essence
of the cause, immediately, it is able to see that the outcome is the
result of a logical implication, from it (cause). Just as the sum of the
angles is logically implicated from the polygon shape. Nature itself
determines the necessity so the human mind which evolved inside
it and from it, developed the necessary “templates” appropriate to
nature’s laws which apparently operated and still operate in the
course of the evolutionary development of the mind. We come into
this world with these “templates” and innate expectations that
enables the learning process. These “templates” work as instincts
and sometimes we are not even aware of them. By this naturalistic
approach, causal inference is carried out as part of the instinctive
functioning and according to innate “templates” that were
impressed on us in a natural way, during the evolutionary devel-
opment of the humanmind. This approach is supported by a branch
of the philosophy of science known as “evolutionary epistemology”.
This epistemology was developed by Lorenz Konrad (1903e1989)
and others and is, in a sense, a kind of interpretation and increment
of Kant’s epistemology. This interpretation is known in the philo-
sophical literature as EEM (Bradie and Harms, 2015) and in fact is
based on the integration of the teachings of Kant with Darwin’s
theory of evolution. According to this interpretation, a priori con-
cepts or categories, such as space, time, causality, etc., are part of
our thinking and perception mechanism which is the product of
biological evolution that helps a person to survive in his environ-
ment. The following quotation clariﬁes the matter (Evans, 1975,
p. 188e191):
“Just as the form of the ﬁsh is given a priori, prior to any indi-
vidual coping of the young ﬁsh with the water, and just as it is
this form that makes this coping possible; so it is also the case
with our forms of perception and categories in their relationship
to our coping with the real external word by means of experi-
ence...
Rather, all our forms of intuition and categories are thoroughly
natural. Like every other organ, they are evolutionarily devel-
oped receptacles for the reception and retroactive utilization of
those lawful consequences of the thing-in-itself with which we
have to cope if we want to remain alive and preserve our
species.”ausal time arrow in geo-historical explanations, Geoscience Frontiers
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categories of the mind are indeed “a priori” for the individual
person who was born equipped with genetic information con-
taining these patterns, but by being a product of evolution and
from the experience of the person in his environment, he accu-
mulates in them all the phylogenetic experience of the human
species and the biological species that preceded it. In this sense
they are not absolute e a priori e as Kant thought. This approach
argues, indirectly, that there is a possibility in principle to make a
reduction between the laws of evolutionary biology, the cognitive
laws and the laws of logic. In recent years this reducibility thesis
was formulated more radically and states that classical laws of
logic can be derived directly from the theory of evolution. It can be
said in terms of reduction that logic is reducible to evolutionary
theory and logical law comes directly from evolutionary law
(Cooper, 2001, p. 2e5). That is, there are no laws of logic that are
separated from the laws of evolution. All the laws of logic can be
explained and described with concepts from the ﬁeld of evolu-
tionary biology. The following quotation clariﬁes and supports this
claim (Cooper, 2001, p. 17):
“That this is possible is a hypothesis called here the Reducibility
Thesis. It states that the laws of logic, or at least of classical logic
and certain generalizations of it, are reducible to evolutionary
biology in a standard sense: The terms of the logical are deﬁn-
able in evolutionary terms and logical assertions are deducible
from evolutionary assertions.
If the Reducibility Thesis has merit, the principles of rationality
are so deeply embedded in evolutionary theory that their foun-
dations cannot rigorously be investigated independently of it.”
In the present article I attempt to support this claim and to
extend it into the ﬁeld of geology. As mentioned above, evolution of
the ﬂora and fauna is directly affected by the geological evolution of
Earth. Therefore, if we assume that categories of the mind and laws
of logic can be reduced to the laws of biology, this implies the
possibility to reduce the laws of logic to the laws of geology. Ex-
amples cited in this article integrating laws of logic with physical
laws that describe geological processes and phenomena, support
this claim.
Hume noted two signiﬁcant characteristics of the causal rela-
tionship: the proximity and the preceding of the cause to the
outcome in time. In the present article I would like to emphasize
the last characteristic because it expresses the unidirectional nature
of the causal chain. Otherwise, what happens in the present would
not necessarily reﬂect what has really happened in the past. More
speciﬁcally, without the unidirectional causality, causal chains
lasting for a long-term could not have been formed and timewould
mean nothing and would have been left without a history. As I have
shown above, the necessity of the causal connection probably lies in
the unidirectional laws of nature, such as the second law of ther-
modynamics, the laws of radiation, radioactivity etc. Even the laws
of biological evolution are characterized by a unidirectional feature
irreversible in time, that has become impressed in the humanmind
and determined its structure.
If so, the general laws of nature express general causal links and
justify speciﬁc causal links. In other words, we could reasonably
assume that the category of causality was derived from general
unidirectional laws, by which the mind can justify and understand
the speciﬁc causal links that we encounter in science and in
everyday life. The following quote explains and supports this
argument, in a certain sense (Evans, 1975, p. 211):
“Sincewe are today ignorant of its physiological foundations, we
can examine the category of causality only through criticalPlease cite this article in press as: Kravitz, G., The possible source of the c
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prehending the same natural lawfulness aimed at by the
disposition to acquire conditioned reﬂexes. We cannot deﬁne
the concept of cause and effect in any other way than by
determining that the effect receives energy from the cause in
some form or other. The essence of propter hoc which alone
differentiates it qualitatively from a uniform post hoc lies in the
fact that cause and effect are successive links in the inﬁnite
chain of phenomenal forms that energy assumes in the course of
its everlasting existence.”
Forms of causal-logical structures in geo-historical explanations,
as described in the beginning of the article, justify this claim in a
way. In these structures, the description of an event should be
obtained from the laws and the descriptions of the circumstances in
which the event occurred. According to this concept, we are enti-
tled to resort to the causal argument after we have built a scientiﬁc
explanation for an event. The events or conditions, described in the
premises of this explanation, are the causes, and events described
in the conclusion, are the outcome. According to this view, the
cause and the outcome are events linked by a law with a basic
structure “if C will occur then E will also occur” and in it the uni-
directional causal time arrow, irreversible in time, is immanently
impressed.
I assume that causality indeed exists in nature and is expressed
through the laws of nature. In the case of geo-history, causality
originates from the asymmetric, unidirectional laws of nature in
which the cause always precedes the outcome, and it is expressed
in geo-historical explanations using logical arguments inwhich the
ﬁrst argument is the logical-causal sentence “If C occurs then E also
occurs”. In this sense, as in the philosophy of Leibniz, I maintain
that the truths of our minds reﬂect the world, but in order to use
such an argument, we should assume that a harmony of all things
with all things, exists. This assumption can have a signiﬁcant
justiﬁcation based of the assumption that man evolved as an in-
tegral part of nature and, therefore, when he enacts the laws of
nature through categories of the mind and certain sensual per-
ceptions which are themselves a product of nature, harmony exists
between man and nature. In an epistemological and mental
respect, this harmony is expressed through adjustment of all ideas
with all of the objective situations expressed by them. The one who
is responsible for this harmony, according to Leibniz, is God and I
am transferring this responsibility to the process of evolution
connecting the development of nature in the inanimate world
(geological world) and the development of ﬂora and fauna (evo-
lution), in which emotions, sensory mechanisms that operate the
senses, wisdom and the categories of the mind, evolved.5. Discussion and conclusions
In this article, I claim that the origins of categories and forms of
perception derive from the evolutionary experience acquired by the
human biology over time. They were created from this experience
and therefore can apply only to objects suitable to the conditions of
experience. For example, we must assume the law of causality in
order to facilitate the transition from the subjective sensations to
the objective world. From a formal logical aspect this law is not
necessary, but without it any experience would be impossible. This
structure is made possible by assuming that the laws of causality
arrange the events according to the direction of their progress in
time. We assume a priori, that there is a rule that determines the
objective order of events in time. This rule allows us to go from the
order of sensations to the order of events themselves. If we had not
assumed a rule according to which the outcome follows the causeausal time arrow in geo-historical explanations, Geoscience Frontiers
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interpret the subjective order by an objective order. As I have tried
to show throughout the article, this rule originates in the evolu-
tionary processes that signiﬁcantly inﬂuences our way of thinking.
Evolutionary development of geological and biological processes in
time, imprints the causality law in the human mind which has
developed within the framework of those laws allowing us to
organize events in one objective time during which mankind has
evolved.
Moreover, the “objectivation”30 process through categories and
sensual perceptions, does not apply only to external objects, but to
mental events as well (Bergmann, 1972, p. 132). The consolidation
of mental experiences into a uniﬁed unit is an “objectivation”
construction just like the construction of cells or atoms in biology
or in physics. For this consolidation, we need an objective back-
ground, the background of time, which we use in order to deter-
mine objective mental events, just as we use space and time
together, to determine physical objects. In this sense a certain
similarity exists between emotional events and events that occur in
the physical world and that alone could indicate a unity in the laws
of nature in which the human mind evolved, and that there is no
substantial difference between assuming the arrow of time to
explainmental events and assuming it to explain physical events. In
this sense, thought builds the emotional and physical objects by
laws which are supposedly determined by it within the capacities
of the mind itself. I maintain that these capacities have evolved in
the course of the evolutionary history of the mind. It follows that
the mind theoretically assumes time a priori before any experience,
but actually time have been before the mind and what remained to
be develop for the mind was in the domain of the mind, and not the
other way round, as claimed by Kant. In other words, unlike Kant,
my position is that the mind is not a condition (prerequisite) for
experience, but rather that experience is the condition (prerequi-
site) for the mind. This is the reason why apparently every physical
or psychological object is subjected to categories and sensual per-
ceptions, but the truth is, that the correct term is not “subjected”
but rather there is a match between the actual natural laws existing
in nature and the categories derived from the humanmind that has
evolved under the same laws. Therefore we can conclude that only
an object suitable to the prerequisite, can appear possible to us.
Other possibilities do not exist for a mind that has developed in the
frame of experience and causal laws that determine the objective
order of events in time.
If we assume that the external thing (experience) is totally foreign
to awareness and consciousness, how then are we able to explain why
it is still subject to their prerequisites? The answer can be found as a
result of our assuming the existence of the evolutionary world as
described in the teachings of Darwin.We are creatures that develop
in the developing world, hence the correlation between our
cognition and consciousness, and the real world. Therefore the
external world and experience is no stranger to awareness and
cognition, because consciousness is subjected to the outside world
rather than the outside world e to consciousness, as Kant thought.
Kant’s transcendental proof reveals the prerequisites of experience,
but cannot answer the question: Why is the independent external30 The objectivation process is the operation of constructing a uniﬁed and con-
stant object from a multitude of sensations. It connects different emotions to a
permanent connection and holds the connection created in this way despite the
changes inside the feelings, and the changes occurring in the things themselves. In
this process the object is being created in our minds out of the connection of many
impressions. In order to isolate an object and to hold it in its identity in this pro-
liferation, we have to go through a multiplicity of sensations, assemble and high-
light them as a single unit in front of other impressions of the environment. For
further details, see: Bergmann (1972, p. 119e145).
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(2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gsf.2016.05.006world subjected to the conditions of our experience? The sensations
themselves, offer us the rawmaterial for mental activities, obtained
in the course of human evolution, design of shape, allowing them to
match the requirements of the mind which is itself the product of
that evolution. In other words, categories as ways of judgment, like
sensual perception, are physiological brain functions and that,
perhaps, explains their logical a priori validity. Space, time and
causality are pre-prepared in our minds just as the vision is pre-
prepared in our optic nerve. The a priori validity of these ways of
judgment and sensual perceptions, is due to our inherent ability in
a physiological-evolutionary sense. If so, adjusting the world to the
mind is merely adjusting the mind to the world that is the creation
of nature. The world is translucent and comprehensible to humans,
becauseman himself is only the essence of theworld, containing all
the elements that make up the world in his being. The conscious-
ness and awareness of the mind are a creation of the human brain,
which itself is a creation of nature. Categories of our minds and
sensual perceptions are actually functions created for survival,
formed through evolutionary experience and chosen during the
struggle for existence, because they were the most adapted to re-
ality. In other words, the human race has acquired the categories
and sensual perceptions by adaptation to reality. These were the
tools that ﬁt the world and its laws and therefore they were pre-
served and inherited, while other mental tools that did not ﬁt the
actuality of the world were destroyed and lost (Bergmann, 1972,
p. 181).
The purpose of this article was to show, through the explana-
tions, on the basis of fundamental assumptions and scientiﬁc ob-
servations from the ﬁeld of geology and biology, how is it possible
to argue that the humanmind and its tools of logic, originated from
the processes of nature and not necessarily established these laws,
but rather adapted them to the environment in which they evolved
over thousands of years of evolution. Such a claim, if justiﬁed, could
support the claim that nature, in general, and human nature, in
particular, imply that, in principle, there is a possibility to derive the
causal time arrow out of the number of physical arrows of time that
exist in nature, and appear to us to be unidirectional and irre-
versible phenomena. Of course, such a reductionist claim needs
many other justiﬁcations and I leave those to further research.References
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